Self Psychology News
Spring 2008 Self Psychology News
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Table of Contents > Disruption and Repair: A Complex Systems Perspective

Disruption and Repair:
A Complex Systems Perspective

Margaret J. Sperry

New perspectives offer opportunities to refine our understanding of clinical situations and theoretical ideas. The 30th international conference on the Psychology of the Self offered an opportunity to compare self psychological and non-linear dynamic systems (complexity) perspectives on the process of change. In light of those discussions, I wondered how complexity theory might inform our understanding of the role of disruption and repair in the process of change. Who and what is "disrupted?" What does it mean to "repair" a disruption? Who does what to whom?

Kohut's delineation of the empathic stance changed our awareness of the relational context in which disruptions and repairs occur. He argued that the analyst's ability to empathically grasp and convey understanding of the patient's inner world facilitates the establishment of a selfobject transference (Kohut, 1971). When this transference is disrupted, the patient's internal dynamics, objects, and conflicts are not the sole focus of investigation; the impact of the analyst's inevitable "empathic failures" must also be considered. Consequently, empathic failure plays a role in ruptures just as empathic attunement facilitates repair. From this perspective, once ruptures are empathically understood and repaired, the selfobject tie is "restored" and the patient's developmental process "resumes." This formulation implies that the repair reinstates the former relationship and selfobject transference. Clinical experience suggests, however, that the nature of the relationship itself may change; the process ushers in new relational possibilities. Describing what emerges as simply the restoration and resumption of the selfobject transference minimizes the significance of this shift.

Kohut also recognized that something changes as a result of the disruption and repair process. He argued that optimal frustration promotes the internalization of the analyst's function; that is, if the frustration created by the empathic lapse is "tolerable," then the rupture and repair process supports the acquisition of psychic structure (Kohut, 1984). Although Kohut's conceptualization of transmuting internalization suggests that something changes when ruptures are repaired, his focus on psychic structure does not address the systemic nature of the shift.

Infant research further elaborates the dyadic quality of rupture and repair sequences. Beebe and Lachmann (2002) and Stern (1985) demonstrate that ongoing regulations create "expectancies" which organize relational experiences. When the coordination of regulation is disrupted, the dyad tends to return to a coordinated state within a matter of seconds (Beebe & Lachmann, 2002). This research implies that disruptions and repairs are systemically mediated, a point I will revisit. Tronick (1989) suggested that sequences of disjunction, repair, and return to coordinated regulation restore regulation as well as establish repair as a possibility. Ongoing, coordinated regulations and moments of mismatch, disjunction, and repair teach an infant "how to be" with another; thus, both processes serve as a basis for "implicit relational knowing" (Stern et. al., 1998). Stern and his colleagues also propose that "moments of meeting," described as "nodal experiences of authentic person to person connection" (1998, p. 904), alter the intersubjective context, thereby changing the "shared implicit relationship." I submit that the disruption and repair process gives rise to "moments of meeting" which change the "shared implicit relationship" while also facilitating reconnection.

Complexity theory also embraces a model of interactive regulation. It further suggests that disruptions are systemic events which affect both members of the dyad and their interactions. Relational expectancies are brought to life and ruptured in a systemic context; the patient's expectancies are not the only ones disturbed—the analyst's are as well. Each influences and "perturbs" (systems language for disruption) the other's relational expectations, affecting the relational patterning and shared implicit relationship. Just as "you can't hold one individual responsible for the sometimes excruciating repetitiveness of relational expectancies and patterns" (Coburn, in press), you can't hold one individual responsible for perturbation. The disruption affects both participants as well as their relationship even though the meaning that it holds will be uniquely contoured by each person's relational history and expectancies.

Also, just as the system bears the effects of disruption, so too it bears responsibility for repair. Even when ruptures seem to be easily repaired, the repair requires coordination. The mutually determined ability of patient and analyst to work collaboratively facilitates and supports the repair—neither can realize it alone. From a complexity perspective, the repair is greater than either could create in isolation.

This brings us to the role of disruption and repair processes in change. Thelen and Smith (1994) argue that development occurs in a context of "stabilization and destabilization" (p. 61). Stolorow (1997) emphasizes that this conception of change "posits that change requires disorganization of the developing system. It is the loss of stability and coherence that provides the bumps that allow the system to discover its new stable patterns. ..." (p. 342). Systemic repairs require the patient and analyst to "reconfigure themselves in relation to one another in creative and novel ways" (Coburn, 2002). Thus, complexity theory implies that in the wake of a disruption and repair process, the system does not resume its former relational patterning. The joint participation in the repair process, whether explicitly discussed or implicitly experienced, alters the relational expectancies and "shared implicit relationship," thereby allowing the system to discover new ways to be together. I suggest that part of what emerges is novel possibilities for formulating meaning and dialogic relatedness with an other (Sucharov, 2007).

Rupture and repair sequences may restore a selfobject tie and facilitate the selfobject transference, as self psychology argues, and create new relational expectancies, as infant research suggests. But neither formulation fully accounts for the clinical perception that something more emerges from the process. Complexity theory emphasizes that the system is changed, and that change is distributed throughout and supported by the entire system. Thus, disruptions destabilize the system, perturbing the understanding each person has of himself, the other, and the way that they interact. The repair process reorganizes the relational experience and expectancies. Taken together, rupture and repair sequences change the system's ability to tolerate, understand, and reorganize in the wake of perturbation, thereby repositioning the system at a new "tipping point" ready for further change to emerge.

References

Beebe, B. & Lachmann, F. (2002), Infant research and adult treatment: Co-constructing interactions, Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press.

Coburn, W. (2002), A world of systems: The role of systemic patterns of experience in the therapeutic process. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, Vol. 22 (5), p. 655-677.

Coburn, W. (2007), Psychoanalytic complexity: Pouring new wine directly into one's mouth. New developments in self psychology practice (Buirski & Kottler, Eds.), In press.

Kohut, H. (1971), The analysis of the self. Madison, CT: International Universities Press.

Kohut, H. (1984), How does analysis cure? (A. Goldberg & P. Stephansky, Eds.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Stern, D. (1985), The interpersonal world of the infant. New York: Basic Books.

Stern, D., Sander, L., Nahum, J., Harrison, Al, Bruschweiler-Stern, N. & Tronick, E. (1998), Non-interpretative mechanisms in psychoanalytic therapy. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 79: 903-921.

Stolorow, R.D. (1997), Dynamic, dyadic, intersubjective systems: An evolving paradigm for psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 14: 337-346.

Sucharov, M. (2007), Kafka's window and Kohut's mirror: A dialogic journey to the center of traumatic worlds. New Developments in Self Psychology Ed. Buirski and Kottler, In press.

Thelen, E. & Smith, L. (1994), A dynamic systems approach to the development of cognition and action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Tronick, E. (1989), Emotions and emotional communication in infants, American Psychologist, 44: 112-119.


Margaret Sperry, Psy.D., M.F.T., is a Supervising and Training Analyst and faculty member at the Institute of Contemporary Psychoanalysis, Los Angeles, and an adjunct faculty member at Antioch University, Los Angeles. She has a private practice in Los Angeles, CA.


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